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The FTC's Proposed Trade Regulation Rule Concerning the Sale of
Used Motor Vehicles
In 1975 Congress empowered the Federal Trade Commission to
prescribe "interpretive rules and general statements of policy with
respect to unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting com-
merce. . . . , and rules which define with specificity acts or practices
which are unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting com-
merce. . . ."' The FTC acted pursuant to this grant of power by
adopting in late 1975 the Preservation of Consumers' Claims and
Defenses Rule which abolished the holder in due course concept in
many consumer contracts.' The Commission has recently adopted a
Used Motor Vehicle Rules which promises' to be even more signifi-
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 15 U.S.C. § 57a(a)(1)(A), (B) (1976). The FTC had previously assumed the power
to make substantive "trade regulation rules" to enhance its ability to protect con-
sumers from unfair or deceptive trade practices, but the Commission had been
challenged on this point. See National Petroleum Ref. Ass'n v. Federal Trade Comm'n,
340 F. Supp. 1343 (D.D.C. 1972), rev'd, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415
U.S. 915 (1974). When the district court in National Petroleum had refused to
recognize the power asserted by the FTC, Congress initiated action to enlarge the
statutory authority of the Commission; the United States Court of Appeals subse-
quently reversed the decision of the district court, agreeing with the Commission. The
Congressional initiative culminated in the FTC Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C. § 57a(a)
(1976), which gave to the Commission the power to make substantive trade regulation
rules. The Act, however, expressly revokes the nonlegislative power asserted by the
Commission in the National Petroleum litigation. 15 U.S.C. § 57a(a)(2) (1976).
The Commission must exercise its power in accordance with the procedures set
out in 15 U.S.C. § 57a(b) (1976), including the publication of proposed rules and the
reasons therefor in the Federal Register, the holding of informal hearings, the submis-
sion of written data, views and arguments of interested persons, and the promulgation
of a final rule based on a rule-making record. See Beltone Elect. Corp. v. Federal
Trade Comm'n, 402 Supp. 590 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
2. 16 C.F.R. § 433 (1979). See Hersbergen, Developments in the Law,
1979-1980-Banking Law, 41 LA. L. REv. 313 (19811. The Preservation of Consumers'
Claims and Defenses Rules does not, for example, apply to direct lenders not affiliated
with the seller. See Hersbergen, supra note 2, at 322-23. See generally, Thomas v.
Ford Motor Credit Corp., 429 A. 2d 277 (Md. App. 1981).
3. 46 Fed. Reg. 41, 329 to 78 (1981) (to be included in 16 C.F.R. § 455 (1981)).
4. Rules adopted by the Commission do not become effective until six months
after the conclusion of a ninety-day Congressional review period 15 U.S.C. § 57a-l(a).
According to a conversation with the Office of the Division of Product Safety, Bureau
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cant than the Consumers' Claims and Defenses Rule. The Used Vehi-
cle Rule, intended to prevent certain well-documented' deceptive
acts or practices in the used car industry, would make it a deceptive
act or practice for any used vehicle dealer" to: 1) misrepresent the
mechanical condition of the vehicle; 2) fail to disclose, prior to sale,
any material defect' in the vehicle's mechanical condition, known to
the dealer; 3) misrepresent at the time of sale that the vehicle, or
any component thereof, is free from such material defects, unless
the dealer has a reasonable basis for such representation at that
time; 4) fail to make available, prior to sale, the terms of any written
warranty8 offered in connection with the sale of the vehicle; 5)
misrepresent the terms of any warranty offered in connection with
the sale; 6) represent that'the vehicle is sold with a warranty when
the vehicle is sold without any warranty; and 7) fail to disclose, prior
to sale, that the vehicle is sold without any warranty.
Compliance with the proposed Rule would be determined principal-
ly by compliance with the requirement of the Rule that there be dis-
played on a side window of a used vehicle a "Used Car Buyers Guide,"
which is a "point of sale" disclosure document in a required form. The
"Buyers Guide" window form, or a copy of the original thereof, must
be given to the buyer, and the information contained therein is re-
quired to be incorporated expressly into the contract of sale, over-
riding any contrary provisions in the contract of sale A dealer can-
of Consumer Affairs, Federal Trade Commission, the ninety-day period was scheduled
to begin on or about January 27, 1981. Should the Used Motor Vehicle Rule, as pro-
posed, be disapproved either by direct Congressional action or by expiration of the
ninety-day period, it is expected that the Rule will be resubmitted in amended form.
5. 46 Fed. Reg. 41,329 to 78 (to be included in 16 C.F.R. § 455 (]981)).
6. The terms "vehicle," "used vehicle," and "dealer" are defined by the Rule to
mean, in composite, any motorized vehicle (other than a motorcycle) with a gross vehicle
weight rating of less than 8500 pounds, a curb-weight of less than 6000 pounds, and a
frontal area of less than 46 square feet, driven more than the limited use necessary in
moving or road testing a new vehicle prior to delivery to a consumer (not including
any vehicle sold for scrap or parts), sold or offered for sale by any person selling or of-
fering for sale five or more used vehicles in the previous twelve months. The Rule
does not apply to banks or financial institutions, a business selling vehicles to an
employee, or a lessor selling a leased vehicle by or to that vehicle's lessee or to an
employee of the lessee. A "consumer" under the Rule is simply any person who is not
a "used vehicle dealer." See 46 Fed. Reg. 41,328 to 59 (1981) (to be included in 16
C.F.R. § 455.1 (c)(1), (2), (3) & (4) (1981).
7. The term "defects" includes a list of common mechanical ailments ranging
from oil leakage and cracked frames to missing belts and inoperative gauges. 46 Fed.
Reg. 41,328, 41,359, 41,366 to 67 (1981) (to be included in 16 C.F.R. §§ 455.2, .6 (1981).
8. By "warranty!' the Rule means any undertaking in writing to refund, repair,
replace, maintain or take other action with respect to a used vehicle, provided at no
extra charge beyond the price of the vehicle.
9. 46 Fed. Reg. 41,328, 41,362 (1981) (to be included in 16 C.F.R. § 455.3(a), (b)(1981)). The dealer must include conspicuously in each consumer contract of sale the
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not make any statements, oral or written, or take other actions
which alter or contradict the "Buyers Guide" window form dis-
closures, or the incorporation clause."0 If the sale is conducted in the
Spanish language the window form and incorporation clause must be
in that language."
A used vehicle has a defect if any of the criteria of paragraphs
(a) through (i) of section 455.6 of the Rule are met,'2 or if the vehicle
fails to meet the standards established by specific testing pro-
cedures set forth in paragraphs (j) through (n) of section 455.6.3
However, the dealer is not required by the Rule to inspect the
vehicle"4 for the presence of any such defects; the requirements of
disclosure apply only to known defects.
The FTC's Used Car Rule is designed to complement the 1975
Magnuson-Moss Act,"5 which imposed "point of sale" disclosure re-
quirements on sales of new vehicles and other products accompanied
by written warranties."6 Written warranties perhaps are less fre-
following language:
The information you see on the window form for this vehicle is part of this con-
tract. Information on the window form overrides any contrary provisions in the
contract of sale.
A copy of the "Buyer's Guide" is contained in the appendix to this article at p. 538.
10. 46 Fed. Reg. 41,328, 41,362 (1981) (to be included in 16 C.F.R. § 455.4 (1981)).
Negotiations over warranty terms may result in final warranty terms that differ from
the window form, but such final warranty terms must be identified in the contract of
sale and given to the buyer.
11. 46 Fed. Reg. 41,328, 41,363 (1981) (to be included in 16 C.F.R. § 455.5 (1981)).
12. "Abnormal exhaust discharge" or "oil leakage, excluding normal seepage," for
example, if known to the dealer, must be disclosed on the "Buyer's Guide" window
form as a "major known defect" in the engine. 46 Fed. Reg. 41,328, 41,366 (1981) (to be
included in 16 C.F.R. § 455.6(b)(1), (5) (1981)).
13. Paragraphs (j) through (n) of 46 Fed. Reg. 41,328, 41,366 to 67 (1981) (to be in-
cluded in 16 C.F.R. § 455.6 (1981)), establish specific tests to determine the presence of
various defects. For example, if the brake pedal on a vehicle equipped with power
brakes does not remain firm under pressure, that is a defect in the power brake
system. That determination is made objectively by the following procedure:
With the engine running on vehicles equipped with power brake systems, and
the igniton turned to "on" in other vehicles, apply a force of 125 pounds to the
brake pedal and hold for 10 seconds. Make sure that there is no decrease in pedal
height and that the failure lamp [if original equipment] does not light.
46 Fed. Reg. 41,328, 41,366 (1981) (to be included in 16 C.F.R. § 455.6(j)(2) (1981)).
Similar testing procedures are established for other facets of the brake system and for
the steering and suspension systems, tires and wheels.
14. 46 Fed. Reg. 41,328, 41,366 (1981) (to be codified in 16 C.F.R. § 455.6 (1981)).
15. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1980).
16. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1980). See Banks, The Magnuson.Moss Warranty Act:
an Untapped Adjunct to the Law of Redhibition. 26 Loy. L. REV. 263 (1980); Miller &
Kanter, Litigation Under Magnuson-Moss: New Opportunities in Private Actions, 13
U.C.C. L.J. 10 (1980). In Title I of the Magnuson-Moss Act, Congress directed the FTC
to initiate the rulemaking proceedings that have culminated in the Used Car Rule. 15
U.S.C. § 2309(b) (1980). The Rule defines the terms "warranty," "implied warranty,"
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quent in the used car industry, but a written warranty accompany-
ing the sale of a used vehicle would come under the Magnuson-Moss
Act as well as the Used Car Rule.17 The present forum is inap-
propriate for an exhaustive analysis of the effect the Used Car Rule
would have on Louisiana's underlying law of redhibition, and such an
analysis of the Magnuson-Moss Act has been ably presented else-
where; 8 however, the following conclusionary comments are ap-
propriate.
The "Buyers Guide" incorporates the following six disclosures
which dealers would be required to display on all used vehicles of-
fered for sale:
1. Warranty benefits offered. The disclosure summarizes what
systems the dealer is warranting (if any), the length of coverage for
each system, and the percentage of repair costs the dealer will pay.
The disclosure also requires the dealer to label his warranty as
"full" or "limited," to show whether a "service contract" is available,
and to advise the buyer that state law implied warranties may give
him even more rights.
2. "As is"/"implied warranties only." The Buyers Guide is
premised upon the Uniform Commercial Code treatment of "as is"
sales as a valid disclaimer of implied warranties. In states where the
"as is" term is prohibited or (as in Louisiana) limited in effect, an
alternative "implied warranties only" disclosure is to be made.
. 3. Known major defects. The disclosure of known major defects
would, of course, bring such defects within Louisiana Civil Code article
2522.
4. Spoken promises warning. The buyer is warned by the
Buyers Guide that oral promises not put in writing are difficult to
enforce.
5. Pre-purchase Inspection. The Buyers Guide encourages the
buyer to inquire about the possibility of a pre-sale inspection of the
vehicle by a third-party.
6. Mechanical Systems List. The Buyers Guide sets out four-
teen major mechanical and safety systems and invites the consumer
to inquire about the current condition of those systems and about
any warranty coverage offered with respect to them.
and "service contract" in a manner that conforms to the definition of those terms in
the Magnuson-Moss Act. 15 U.S.C. § 2301(6)(B), (7), (8) (1980); 46 Fed. Reg. 41.328,
41,359 (1981) (to be included in 16 C.F.R. § 455.1(c)(5), (6), (7) (1981)).
17. Trade Regulation Rule Concerning the Sale of Used Motor Vehicles-State-
ment of Basis and Purpose, 46 Fed. Reg. 41,328, 41,346 (1981).
18. See Banks, The Magnuson.Moss Warranty Act: An Untapped Adjunct to the
Law of Redhibition, 26 Loy. L. REV. 263 (1980); McCowan, Impact of the Magnuson-
Moss Warranty Act on Louisiana Law, 23 LA. B.J. 275 (1976).
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If a written warranty is offered, the Magnuson-Moss Act also ap-
plies and would require the dealer (of a used or a new vehicle which
is a "consumer product"'") to:
1. fully and conspicuously disclose in simple and readily
understood language the terms and conditions of such warranty,
in accordance with § 2302 of the Act,2" and of the Commission's
rules;21
2. Designate the warranty as a "limited warranty," unless
it can be designated as a "full warranty" by meeting the specific
minimum standards of § 2304 of the Act;22
3. Make available, prior to sale, the text of the warranty;23
4. Disclose the availability of any informal dispute settle-
ment mechanism;
5. Forego disclaimer or modification or implied warranties."
Effect of the Used Car Rule on Louisiana Law
If permitted by Congress to become effective, the proposed FTC
rule would be compatible with the commandment of Civil Code arti-
cle 2474 that the seller "is bound to explain himself clearly respect-
ing the extent of his obligations," and that of Civil Code articles
1847, 2547 and 2548, concerning fraud on the part of the seller. The
Used Car Rule and the Magnuson-Moss Act effectively advance the
time of disclosure from the point of closing to the "point of sale,"
and, of course, prescribe a format for the disclosures respecting war-
ranties offered by the seller. Arguably, that part of the Rule requir-
ing disclosures as to "warrantly benefits offered" would add very lit-
tle to current Louisiana law. The same may be said of the require-
ment of disclosure of known defects. Practically speaking, the known
defect disclosure requirement and the format of the Buyers Guide
should reduce the incidence of seller concealment cases.
The "pre-purchase inspection" item, and the "mechanical
systems list" each invite the buyer to make an inquiry that ulti-
mately may avoid litigation. No duty is imposed upon the seller to
inspect the vehicle himself or to allow the prospective buyer to have
the vehicle inspected elsewhere -ostensibly consistent with current
Louisiana law-but, practically speaking, a sale should be lost by
19. 15 U.S.C. § 2301(1) (1980).
20. 15 U.S.C § 2302 (1980).
21. 16 C.F.R. §§ 701-703 (1975).
22. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2303, 2304 (1980).
23. 16 C.F.R. § 702 (1975).
24. 16 C.F.R. § 703 (1975).
25. 15 U.S.C. § 2306 (1975).
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the dealer's refusal to permit a pre-purchase inspection by a third-
party.
In Louisiana the "as is" term does not constitute a renunciation
of implied warranty; that being so, it would be deceptive for a Loui-
siana dealer to use the "no implied warranty-as is" disclosure as
set forth in the model Buyers Guide. The substitute "implied war-
ranties only" disclosure form would seem to apply.2"
The "known defect" disclosure may be somewhat broader than
the concept of redhibitory defect. For example, a missing or in-
operative belt would not necessarily meet the standard for red-
hibitory defects, but it is a defect which if known to the dealer must
be disclosed under the Used Car Rule. The same may be said as to
"abnormal exhaust discharge," "battery leakage," "inoperable
gauges," "improper alignment," "tire tread depth"; all are defects or
possible defects under the Rule, without regard to the mileage of
the vehicle. In Louisiana, however, such defects might be
redhibitory if in a new automobile, but not necessarily so in an older
or high-mileage automobile.
The requirement of the Magnuson-Moss Act of "simple and
readily understood" warranty disclosure language only restates the
requirement inherent in Civil Code articles 1957, 1958 and 2474,
while the "full" or "limited" label requirement simply enhances the
language of Civil Code article 2474. A disclosure of the availability
of informal dispute settlement mechanisms perhaps would not be re-
quired otherwise, but such a disclosure appears to be in the dealer's
own interests in any event. The inability of a dealer under the Act
to combine a written warranty and a renunciation of implied warranties
merely prohibits that which is currently an infrequent occurrence in
Louisiana. 7
Because a written warranty has FTC Used Car Rule implica-
tions, and brings the Magnuson-Moss Act and its non-waiver of red-
hibition feature to bear on the sale, buyers naturally will seek to
portray various words and phrases in the contract or in the dis-
closures incorporated therein as a "written affirmation of fact or
written promise ...which relates to the nature of the material or
workmanship and affirms or promises that such material or work-
manship is defect-free or will meet a specified level of performance
26. See 46 Fed. Reg. 41,328, 41,362 (1981) (to be included in 16 C.F.R. § 455.2(b)
(1981)).
27. See Hersbergen, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the
1978-1979 Term-Consumer Protection, 40 LA. L. REV. 619, 619-23 (1980).
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over a specified period of time."28 New automobile dealers are re-
quired to state for each vehicle the estimated miles per gallon, or
fuel economy rating, for purposes of buyer comparison. The figures
stated are those of the United States government, not of the dealer
or manufacturer, and accompanying disclaimers do indicate that the
figures are only an estimate of the fuel economy of the vehicle.29 A
recent New York case has held that such estimates do not constitute
a written warranty as to fuel economy."
Louisiana courts probably would agree with the New York
court's assessment of the estimated MPG, but the issue is not en-
tirely free of doubt." Likewise uncertain is the related issue of poor
fuel economy as a redhibitory defect. In Willis v. Ford Motor Co.
32
the Third Circuit Court of Appeal awarded the buyer of a new, fuel-
inefficient automobile a reduction in price, but poor fuel economy
was only one of several alleged redhibitory defects which, in cumula-
tion, were sufficient to support the reduction in price. The trial
judge's remarks, incorporated into the court of appeal's opinion, sug-
gest that none of the defects, including poor fuel economy, in-
dividually would support the action. Because the redhibition action
is premised not on the defect or defects in the thing, as such, but
rather on the requisite degree of inconvenience of the use of the
thing, the trial court's view of cumulative (individually non-
redhibitory) defects as supportive of the redhibition action seems
sound. Yet, excessive oil consumption or leakage, especially in a new
automobile, is clearly supportive of the action in redhibition,33 and is
not easily distinguishable from excessive fuel consumption.
28. 15 U.S.C. § 2301 (6)(A) (1980). The Magnuson-Moss Act also defines as a "writ-
ten warranty," "any undertaking in writing . . . to refund, repair, replace, or take
other remedial action" with respect to a consumer product in the event the product
fails to meet the specification set forth in the undertaking. 15 U.S.C. § 2301(6)(B) (1980).
The Used Car Rule's definition of "warranty" is similar to that of § 2301(6)(B).
29. The "EPA Fuel Economy Rating" annexed to the bill of sale in Sherman v.
Manhattan Ford Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 104 Misc. 2d 1, 431 N.Y.S.2d 949 (Sup. Ct. Sp.
Term, N.Y. Co. 1980) stated, "Estimated MPG for Comparisons 15," but also stated,
"The estimated mileage for this model, 15, is to be used to compare cars of this model
with other cars. Your own mileage may be poorer depending upon options. driving eon-
ditons, your driving habits and your car's operating condition." 104 Misc. 2d at 3, 431
N.Y.S.2d at 950.
30. Sherman v. Manhattan Ford Lincoln-Mercury. Inc., 104 Misc. 2d 1, 431
N.Y.S.2d 949 (Sup. Ct. Sp. Term, N.Y. Co. 1980).
31. See, e.g., A. Baldwin Sales Co. v. Mitchell, 174 La. 1098, 142 So. 700 (1932);
Hawley Down-Draft Furnance Co. v. Southern Chem. & Fert. Co., 51 La. Ann. 914, 25
So. 470 (1899); Hemenway, Inc. v. Roach, 175 So. 892 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1937).
32; 383 So. 2d 136 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980).
33. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Jacobson-Young, Inc., 244 La. 191, 151 So. 2d 368 (1963);
Beyer v. Estopinal, 224 La. 516, 70 So. 2d 109 (1954); Donachricha v. D'Antoni, 270 So.
2d 149 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972).
34. Louisiana courts have not focused so much on the inconvenience of constantly
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Remedies Under the FTC Used Car Rule and The Magnuson-Moss
Act
Violation of an FTC Trade Regulation Rule can result in a cease-
and-desist order and a $10,000 civil penalty for each violation." Addi-
tionally, the Commission is empowered to bring a civil action for
such relief as is necessary to redress consumer injury, which may in-
clude, but is not limited to, rescission or reformation of contracts,
refunds or return of property, the payment of damages, and public
notification respecting the violation." The Commission, however, has
very limited enforcement resources," and because there are only
very limited circumstances in which a private litigant may personally
sue an FTC rule violator,38 enforcement of the Used Car Rule would
depend heavily on voluntary compliance by dealers. A violator of
the Used Car Rule would, however, be simultaneously in violation of
the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection
Law,39 and an intentional violation of the Rule would seem clearly to
fall within Civil Code articles 1832, 1847, 2545, 2547 and 2548.
The Magnuson-Moss Act does provide for personal civil actions
by consumers, and the action may be premised upon a violation of
the "form and contents" provisions of the act, or upon breach of the
written or implied warranties, or of a service contract.'0 The private
action may be brought in state or federal courts, but to invoke
federal jurisdiction the private claimant must show that each in-
dividual claim is at least $25 in amount and the total amount in
controversy is more than $50,000." In Gorman v. Saf-T-Mate,
having to check oil levels, and adding oil, or even on the added expense caused by ex-
cessive oil consumption. Rather, the focus seems to be two-fold: the added risk of
damage to internal engine parts from low oil levels, and the reasonable inference that
the engine is defective in some respect. Excessive fuel consumption apparently does
not create risk of damage to the engine, but it does suggest some defect in design or
assembly.
35. 15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(1)(A) (1980).
36. 16 U.S.C. § 57b(a), (b) (1975).
37. See Comment, The FTC's Holder-In-Due-Course Rule: An Effective Means of
Achieving Optimality in the Consumer Credit Market, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 821, 856-59
(1978).
38. Compare Holloway v. Bristol-Meyers Corp., 485 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1973) with
Guernsey v. Rich Plan of the Midwest, 408 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. Ind. 1976).
39. LA. R.S. 51:1401-1418 (Supp. 1972); Hersbergen, supra note 27, at 625-27.
40. 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(1) (1976). The federal statutory cause of action relies on
state law as the source of liability for breach of implied warranty.
41. 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(3) (1976). If the action is brought as a class action, the named
plaintiffs must number at least one hundred. Id A consumer may be required to seek
redress through an "informal dispute settlement mechanism" prior to bringing a civil
action under the Act, if the warrantor has established such and notice of the require-
[Vol. 42
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Inc.'2 , the question was whether personal injury claims related to a
breach of warranty could be raised under the Magnuson-Moss Act. The
Gorman decision rules that the private cause of action under the Act
does not permit the recovery of personal injury damages. By contrast to
the Gorman decision and the Magnuson-Moss Act, the distinction
between the traditional Civil Code article 2315 products liability
personal injury action against a manufacturer, and the action in
redhibition under Civil Code article 2545 for restoration of the price,
attorneys fees and damages, grows more faint with the decision of
the Louisiana Supreme Court in Philippe v. Browning Arms Co.'3
Manufacturer Recall of Defective Products
Both the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966"
and the Consumer Product Safety Act of 1972" establish procedures
for the notification and correction of defects in manufactured things.
Even in the absence of the federal legislation, the failure of the
manufacturer to warn purchasers of dangers or defects discovered
after the sale arguably would result in liability premised on Civil
Code articles 1901, 2315, and 2545.6 The primary focus of litigation
involving mandatory recall notifications has been the admissibility
and use of the recall campaign in a products liability case. Recent
decisions outside Louisiana tend to hold that the recall notice is rele-
vant to the issue of probability that the thing was defective at the
time it left the manufacturer's hands.'7 In Louisiana the recall
notification is apparently inadmissible to establish defectiveness at
ment was incorporated into the warranty. 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a) (1980): 16 C.F.R. § 703
(1981). In the absence of an informal dispute settlement mechanism, the consumer must
give the warrantor a reasonable opportunity to cure an alleged noncompliance with the
Act. 15 U.S.C. § 2310(e) (1980). Compare LA. Civ. CODE art. 2531 (seller's obligation to
repair) and Pratt v. Winnebago Indus., Inc., 463 F. Supp. 709 (W.D. Pa. 1979) with Jor-
dan v. LeBlanc & Broussard Ford, Inc., 332 So. 2d 534 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976).
42. 513 F. Supp. 1028 (N.D. Ind. 1981).
43. 395 So. 2d 310 (La. 1981).
44. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1431 (1974).
45. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2081 (1972).
46. Cf. Philippe v. Browning Arms Co., 395 So. 2d 310 (La. 1981) (clarifying the
relationship between Civil Code article 2315 and the Code articles pertaining to the
redhibition action).
47. Comment, Recall Letters as Evidence of a Defect in an Automobile, 29
MERCER L. REV. 611, 617-18 (1978). The existence of a given defect in other like things
does not establish that the defect existed in any particular thing at the time of the in-
jury. Landry v. Adam, 282 So. 2d 590 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973) But as to the issue of
defectiveness at the time the thing left the manufacturer's hand, the recall arguably
would be relevant, since only circumstantial evidence can typically establish that fact,
and the recall would tend to raise an inference of defectiveness at the time of manufac-
ture.
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the time of manufacture.'8 In Thomasson v. A.K. Durnin Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc.,'9 however, a recall campaign by Chrysler resulted in
negligence liability for the seller.
A seller ordinarily is not bound to inspect the thing for nonap-
parent defects," but the seller is bound to perform a reasonable in-
spection of the thing. Reasonableness, of course, is dictated by the
peculiar circumstances in each case. In Thomasson, for example,
Chrysler's recall campaign had been initiated to correct a defect in
the steering system of certain Chrysler automobiles. The automobile
purchased by the Thomassons was within the recall category, but in-
explicably was not specifically listed in the computer print-out
sheets accompanying Chrysler's correspondence to the seller. The
Thomassons had experienced steering problems on several occa-
sions, and the seller was made aware of those difficulties as a result
of its own repair efforts. The steering defect which caused the acci-
dent and resulting injuries to the Thomassons had not been dis-
covered by the seller prior to accident, nor had the Thomassons
been notified of the defect. Because the seller knew of the steering
problems experienced by the Thomassons and had been put on
notice by the recall campaign that the particular type of vehicle sold
to the Thomassons was "suspect," and had in fact been given an op-
portunity to correct what it knew to be a potentially serious defect,
the failure of the seller to go beyond a routine inspection was
negligence, and rendered the seller solidarily liable with Chrysler
for the damages caused by the defect."'
In view of the possibility of attorney's fees awards," one might
well wonder what is the effect of a product recall on the require-
ment of seller knowledge under Civil Code article 2545. It would
48. Landry v. Adam, 282 So. 2d 590 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973). Cf Gauche v. Ford
Motor Co., 226 So. 2d 198 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969) (the court permitted the evidence of
recall to be used in corroboration of other evidence of the existence of a defect in an
automobile brake system). Gauche was questioned in Trahan v. Liberty Mutual In-
surance Co., 273 So. 2d 331 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973).
49. 399 So. 2d 1205 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981).
50. Hunt v. Ford Motor Co., 341 So. 2d 614 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1977).
51. A routine inspection would not have revealed the defect in question; only
disassembly of the defective parts would have done so. The duty to do so was not
mitigated by reliance on Chrysler's list of vehicles to be recalled (which list omitted
the automobile in question) because such lists were known to the seller to have been
incomplete in the past, because the seller was advised of the time frame in which the
"suspect" vehicles were manufactured, and because an inspection of the date plate on
the door frame of the vehicle would have revealed that it was one of the vehicles
within that time frame.
52. Cf. Philippe v. Browning Arms. Co., 395 So. 2d 310 (La. 1981) (manufacturer
liability).
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seem beyond argument that, to the extent the federal recall mech-
anism has led to a formal notification from manufacturer to seller,
the seller is within either Civil Code articles 2545 or 1901 (good
faith) with respect to subsequent sales," so long as the defect is of
the redhibitory nature.5' Whether sellers in the secondary
markets-including private, non-commercial sellers-would be af-
fected would just as obviously seem to be a question of proof of
knowledge of the recall, whether a federal or a voluntary-
manufacturer recall.55 In the event the seller actually has made a
53. The literal sense of Civil Code article 2545 would require the seller to know of
the vice of the thing, so unless the possibility that the thing may be one among the
many similar things subject to the recall is itself to be considered redhibitory in
nature, article 2545 would not seem to apply. Yet, the imputed knowledge of the
manufacturer has been equated with bad faith and fraud. Gordon v. Bates.Crumley
Chevrolet Co., 158 So. 223 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1935). It would, accordingly, be no great
logical jump to say that, at the least, the seller in the recall situation is not in good
faith, and in fact may be within article 1832. Though the recall issue has not been
decided in an article 2545 case, the matter of imputed knowledge has been raised in a
closely related situation. Palmer v. Anchor Marine, Inc.. 331 So. 2d 114 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1976), held that the seller knew of a defect in axle bearings on an all-terrain
pleasure vehicle, based on a prior history of similar defects in similar vehicles sold by
him. Of interest is the fact that the defect in Palmer, as in Thomasson, was of the
character not usually discoverable by a seller. But, said the court:
Once this knowledge [of prior similar defects] was acquired by the seller . . . it
then became an apparent defect as to the seller .... Certainly, if [the seller] did
not know, as a matter of fact, the various vices and defects of this vehicle, he did,
at least have constructive knowledge.
331 So. 2d at 117. The opinion cited Wade v. Mclnnis.Peterson Chevrolet, Inc., 307 So.
2d 798 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1975), in which the court had stated that to recover attorney's
fees under article 2545, "lilt is sufficient for the buyer to prove actual or constructive
knowledge [of the defect] by the seller. Thus, if the seller knew or should have known
of the defect and failed to declare it to the buyer, the seller is liable additionally for
resonable attorney's fees." 307 So. 2d at 803.
The matter of the recall as probative evidence has been before the Louisiana courts
in a few cases. See Landry v. Adams, 282 So. 2d 590 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973) (evidence
of recall was relevant and corroborative of the inference that a defect was built into
the thing during the manufacturing process). See also Greer v. General Motors Corp.,
293 So. 2d 228 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974); Gauche v. Ford Motor Co., 226 So. 2d 198 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1969). In Forstall v. Stewart, 12 La. App. 628, 126 So. 705 (Orl. Cir.
1930), the court noted that the seller, in defending against the buyer's claim that the
thing sold (a refrigerator) was defective, had himself sued the manufacturer alleging
that other, similar refrigerators were so defective that he had been besieged with com-
plaints from his customers. Such evidence may not be fatal to the seller's case, but the
inference of bad faith does seem to arise.
54. Voluntary manufacturer recalls would not necessarily be of the redhibitory
class of defects, but a federal recall almost certainly will be of that class. But cf. Compte
v. Rateau, 242 So. 2d 82 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970) (missing hood latch not a redhibitory
defect).
55. See, e.g., Wheat v. Boutte Auto Sales, 355 So. 2d 611 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978);
Juneau v. Bob McKinnon Cheverolet Co., 260 So. 2d 919 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972);
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claim against the manufacturer for expenses relating to a federal or
voluntary recall, articles 2545 or 1901 certainly would seem to apply
to sales of the affected products thereafter. 8
Repaired or Reconditioned Things
When a damaged or defective thing comes into the hands of a
seller or is damaged while in the hands of the seller, subsequent
repair or reconditioning can free the thing from redhibitory vices.
However, not always will the seller thereby be free of liability
resulting from a subsequent sale. For example, in a case. handed
down several years ago, a previously unsold automobile was sold as
"new" by a dealer when in fact the automobile had been damaged
significantly and subsequently repaired by the dealer prior to the
sale. The failure of the dealer to disclose the material fact of prior
damage, that is, to disclose that the automobile did not possess the
normal characteristics attributable to an automobile represented to
be "new," was held to be fraud within Civil Code articles 1847 and
Plauche, Locke Sec. v. B. Bazerque & Sons, 139 So. 786 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1932). See
also Spillers v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 294 So. 2d 803 (La. 1974); Sokol v. Bob
McKinnon Chevrolet, Inc., 307 So. 2d 404 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975); Barker v. Phoenix
Ins. Co., 220 So. 2d 720 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1969).
56. See Gordon v. Bates-Crumley Chevrolet Co., 158 So. 223 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1935); Forstall v. Stewart, 12 La. App. 628, 126 So. 705 (Orl. Cir. 1930).
Gauche v. Ford Motor Co., 226 So. 2d 198 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969), is perhaps the
only reported Louisiana decision touching upon the relationship between article 2545
and a product recall. The buyer, having disposed of the vehicle, was granted relief
against the seller in the form of quanti minoris, based on a finding of defective
automobile brakes. But against the manufacturer, the fourth circuit cast the case in
fault under article 2315, rather than in implied warranty under article 2545. Thus, on
rehearing, the fact that the automobile in question had been recalled for correction of
possible problems, received these judicial comments:
The circumstance of [the buyer] having driven the automobile for 4,000 miles
without a brake failure and without repairs of adjustments would certainly tend
to corroborate defendants' theory of overheating by brakeriding [i.e., buyer fault
or misuse], but, on the other hand, we have the circumstantance of recall of the
automobile along with 40,000 others of that model for a corrective modification of
the braking system. This circumstance, in our opinion, tips the scales in favor of a
preponderance of evidence that the brakes ...were in fact defective.
The defendant ... has cited an impressive list of authorities ... [which] clearly
support Ford's contention that we were in error in considering the ... recall ...
as evidence of its "negligence" or actionable fault in the manufacture of plaintiffs
automobile. We concede our error in this respect, but we fail to find anything in
any of the authorities cited holding that such circumstances cannot properly be
considered in corroboration of other evidence of the existence of a defect in the
braking system of a particular automobile.
226 So. 2d at 210, 211. While the redhibitory defect/negligence dichotomy detracts
from the analytical usefulness of the Gauche case, product recalls seemingly will be
relevant to the article 2545 issue in a case squarely presenting that issue.
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2547."7 The automobile was not redhibitorily defective in the sense
of Civil Code article 2520; it did, however, fail to have a declared
quality in the sense of Civil Code articles 2529 and 2547. A similar
result is seen in Betz v. Reynaud Construction Co., 8 in which a
builder-seller sold, under the implied representation that it was con-
structed of new and undamaged materials, a previously unsold house
that had been damaged by fire, and subsequently repaired. The
builder-seller had not replaced some smoke-stained or lightly char-
red rafters the structural intergity of which had not been affected
by the fire. Thus, there was no "defect" in the house. Unlike any
subsequent seller of the house, the builder-seller had the obligation
to reveal the unrepaired damages in order to avoid a misrepresenta-
tion under Civil Code article 2547. By contrast, each sub-vendee of a
redhibitorily defective thing is subrogated to the rights of his ven-
dor."8
For the real estate broker, a case such as Betz can be disturb-
ing, for however confused the state of the law as to the broker's
duties may be,"0 clearly the broker has a duty to reveal to the pro-
spective purchaser the existence of a known material defect in the
contemplated premises. The DeSoto v. Ellis decision' adopts that
view, but because the broker believed that the defect had been
remedied, 2 the issue was not the concealment of a known defect, but
whether a reasonable person would have concluded, differently than
did the broker, that informing a prospective purchaser of a defect
that had apparently been remedied was unnecessary. The trial
court's judgment in favor of the broker was affirmed.
The Seller's Obligation to Repair
In 1973 the Louisiana Supreme Court held in Prince v. Paretti
Pontiac Co." that no Louisiana Civil Code provision required a pur-
chaser who seeks to prove a redhibitory defect to first give his vendor
57. Tauzin v. Sam Broussard Plymouth, Inc., 283 So. 2d 266 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1973).
58. 396 So. 2d 412 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1981).
59. DeSoto v. Ellis, 393 So. 2d 847 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1981), and cases cited therein.
60. See Latter & Blum, Inc. v. Richmond, 388 So. 2d 368 (La. 1980); Comment, The
Law of Real Estate Brokerage Contracts: The Broker's Commission, 41 LA. L. REV.
857 (1981); Comment, The Real Estate Broker-Purchaser Relationship: Louisiana and
the Common Law, 52 TUL. L. REV. 157 (1977).
61. 393 So. 2d 847 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1981). See also Hersbergen, supra note 27, at
623-25.
62. At issue was the sale of a house constructed upon an unstable foundation. Cer-
tain work had been performed at the recommendation of a civil engineer to make the
house structurally sound. 393 So. 2d at 848.
63. 281 So. 2d 112 (La. 1973).
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the opportunity to repair the thing sold. The Prince opinion did con-
cede that such an opportunity to repair perhaps previously had been
inferable from numerous cases in which a buyer had sought a
restoration of the price only after first affording the seller one or
more opportunities to repair the alleged redhibitory defects. The
court's pronouncement seemingly meant that even a diagnosed and
easily repairable defect could form the basis of a redhibition action
against a good faith seller who stood ready and willing to repair at
no cost to the buyer. No doubt, the court had correctly assessed the
letter of the law: no such opportunity to repair was expressly set
forth in the Civil Code or elsewhere. Yet, the court seemingly let
pass a fine opportunity to set a meaningful policy: the oppor-
tunity/obligation to repair is easily gleaned from Civil Code article
1901's principle of performance in good faith-a principle equally ap-
plicable to a buyer and a seller-and from article 1903's principle of
incidental obligations derived from equity and custom.
Within a year of the Prince decision, Civil Code article 2531 was
amended" to provide expressly that the good faith seller is only
bound to "repair, remedy or correct" redhibitory defects, or if he is
unable or fails to do so, "then he must restore the purchase price .... "
Under amended Civil Code article 2531 an action for restoration of
the price is considered premature prior to a tender to the seller for
repair. 5 Civil Code article 2544 ostensibly subjects the action for a
reduction in theprice to "the same rules and to the same limitations
as the redhibitory action"; that should mean, among other things,
that the buyer who contents himself with a reduction in price first
must tender the thing to the seller for repair just as must the buyer
who seeks a full restoration of the price. In what must be seen as at
least an ironic twist, recent decisions have not required the buyer to
tender the thing for repair prior to seeking a reduction in price.
Prior to the 1974 amendment to Civil Code article 2531, Loui-
siana courts routinely applied article 2544 literally. If a seller in a
successful restoration of the price action was entitled to also
recover finance charges attributable to the purchase price, so too
could the buyer recover finance charges attributable to repair costs
in an action for reduction of the price;88 if the seller was not in good
64. 1974 La. Acts, No. 673, § 1.
65. Jordan v. LeBlanc & Broussard Ford, Inc., 332 So. 2d 534 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1976).
66. Johnson v. H.W. Parsons Motors, Inc., 231 So. 2d 73 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1970).
The most scholarly dissertation on the theory of recovery by the buyer in reduction of
price cases appears in Menville v. Stephens Chevrolet, Inc., 300 So. 2d 858 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1974).
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faith, the buyer in a reduction in price case would be entitled to
damages and attorney's fees under Civil Code article 2545, even
though that article speaks only of the restitution of price case."' Of
course, it was well established prior to 1974 that if the buyer could
not or would not tender to the seller the return of the thing itself,
his action would be limited to one for a reduction in the price," for
which action no tender of return of the thing was required. That
rule made sense under the former version of Civil Code article 2531,
but under amended article 2531, a tender of return becomes mean-
ingless; any tender of the thing will be deemed a tender for repair,
the buyer's denomination to the contrary notwithstanding. 9
Three recent decisions have ruled that a tender for repair is not
necessary in an action for reduction of price, despite the literal
sense of Civil Code article 2544. Whether the decisions are correct is
debatable, but the reasoning offered in all three is, at best, sloppy.
The decisions in Rausch v. Hanberry" and Dunn v. Pauratore" rely
in their rulings that'a tender for repair is not required in a reduc-
tion in price case on Sokol v. Bob McKinnon Chevrolet, Inc.,"2 a 1975
decision. Sokol, however, did not address the tender for repair issue,
but instead correctly holds that a tender of return of the thing is
not necessary in a reduction in price case. The Dunn decision also
suggests that tender for repair is unnecessary in a reduction in
price action where the defect poses an immediate threat to the
buyer's safety." That answer seems to beg the question, since such
an immediacy of danger probably would dispense with any tender
that otherwise might be required."
Coffin v. Laborde" indirectly relies on Sokol by agreeing with
67. Sokol v. Bob McKinnon Chevrolet, Inc. 307 So. 2d 404 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975).
68. See Sokol v. Bob McKinnon Chevrolet, Inc., 307 So. 2d 404 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1975); Johnson v. H.W. Parsons Motors, Inc., 231 So. 2d 73 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1970).
69. See Burns v. Lamar-Lane Chevrolet, Inc.. 354 So. 2d 620 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1977). Cf. Stumpf v. Metairie Motor Sales, Inc.. 212 So. 2d 705 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968)
(suggesting that a tender may be found so long as the buyer does not prevent the
seller's access to the thing or otherwise hamper the seller's opportunity to repair).
70. 377 So. 2d 901 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979).
71. 387 So. 2d 1227 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980).
72. 307 So. 2d 404 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975).
73. The defects in Dunn, a home sale case, were a leaking gas pipe and an unsafe
furnace.
74. Cf. Madere v. Sharp, 230 La. 723, 89 So. 2d 214 (1956) (unseaworthy vessel); II-
genfritz v. Radalec, Inc., 226 La. 59, 74 So. 2d 903 (1954) (repair attempts probably
would have been futile); Poor v. Hemenway. 221 La. 770, 60 So. 2d 310 (1952)
(unseaworthy vessel); Mattes v. Heintz, 69 So. 2d 924 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1954) (defective
water line required immediate repair to prevent damage to the purchaser's property).
75. 393 So. 2d 915 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1981).
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and citing Rausch, but perhaps recognizes that Sokol is inapposite
by pointing out that Johnson v. H.W. Parsons Motors, Inc."8 and
Bendana v. Mossy Motors, Inc.," the facts of both of which arose
prior to the 1974 amendment, did not require a tender for repair in
a reduction in price case, despite jurisprudence at the time which re-
quired such a tender in a restoration of price case. The Coffin opi-
nion characterizes the 1974 amendment as merely a legislative
restatement of that jurisprudence. In fact, however, the buyer in
Sokol did return the thing to the seller for the correction of the
defect, only to find that the reason the interior of her automobile
was not being cooled properly was because it was not equipped with
air conditioning as the seller had represented. 8 Clearly the seller
had the opportunity then and there to correct that defect. In
Johnson the seller clearly acquiesced in the buyer's efforts to obtain
repairs elsewhere, paying half of one repair bill and requesting the
buyer to take the vehicle to another dealer for repairs. 9 In Bendana the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal heard only the appeal of the
manufacturer, and although a tender for repair had been made
through a dealer, the tender for repair issue was not before the
court. In any event, the manufacturer is not considered a good faith
seller to whom tender for repair is required." Thus, neither Sokol,
Johnson nor Bendana support the position taken in Rausch, Dunn
and Coffin. Furthermore, the "jurisprudential rule" stressed in Coffin
was not a rule at all, but as suggested by the Supreme Court in
Prince the opportunity to repair "requirement" was merely an
erroneous judicial inference,8 at odds with the Civil Code's expressed
requirements. In fact, the Louisiana Supreme Court had suggested
in 1955 that no such right to repair existed.82
76. 231 So. 2d 73 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1970).
77. 347 So. 2d 946 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977).
78. 307 So. 2d at 405.
79. 231 So. 2d at 75.
80. See Laughlin v. Fiat Distribs., Inc., 368 So. 2d 742 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979);
Bernard v. Bradley Auto., 365 So. 2d 1382 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1978); Burns v. Lamar-
Lane Chevrolet, Inc., 354 So. 2d 620 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977).
81. 281 So. 2d at 116.
82. In Radalec, Inc. v. Automatic Firing Corp., 228 La. 116. 121, 81 So. 2d 830, 832
(1955), the seller defended the redhibition action on the ground that the buyer had not
allowed it to replace the defective parts in the thing. The court did not find the argu-
ment persuasive:
The fact that the defects were confined to a specific part of the machine and
that the units could have been made to function properly by installing new motors
or by rehabilitating the defective ones, does not furnish a valid basis for denying
plaintiff the remedy of redhibition as provided by Article 2520.
See also Fisher v. City Sales & Serv., 128 So. 2d 790 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961); Roby
Motors Co. v. Harrison, 139 So. 686 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1932).
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The Rausch, Dunn and Coffin view of the relationship (or lack
thereof) between Civil Code articles 2544 and 2531 is not necessarily
incorrect, and actually favors the consumer. Still, permitting the
buyer who has contented himself with a reduction in price demand
to refuse the seller an opportunity to correct the defects, and yet
charge the seller for that same correction by a third-party seems un-
fair. Perhaps some concern exists for the plight of the buyer who ob-
tains repairs elsewhere without first tendering the thing to the
seller. Such concern is probably misplaced, in that the typical buyer
is not likely to call on a third-party for repairs without some prior
(and presumably successful) contact with the seller.
The decisions in Rausch, Dunn and Coffin could have correctly
ruled that a tender for repair is required in the reduction in price
case by virtue of the interrelationship between Civil Code article
2544, 2531 and 1901, but that, as in a restoration of the price case,
the tender for repair requirement is not immutably indispensable.83
In Rausch, for example, the buyers alleged that the seller was in
bad faith; if bad faith is provable, such a seller is not entitled to re-
quire a tender for repair under article 2531. Furthermore, the oppor-
tunity to correct was not likely to be seized by the seller in the
Rausch case, even if the defect was correctible. ' The Dunn case in-
volved a defective home heating unit part that posed a threat to the
buyer's safety. Was it not reasonable to have the defective part
replaced, as opposed to first demanding that the non-merchant seller
of the home repair the defect, especially when, at best, the seller
will simply hire a repair contractor anyway? It was well established
before 1974, for example, that the buyer's employment of a third-
party repair contractor did not limit him to a reduction in price ac-
tion where diagnostic dismantling by the third-party was no more an
undertaking that the seller himself would have been required to per-
form. 5 Finally, the Coffin facts indicate a plumbing problem
arguably within the emergency circumstances exception to the
tender requirement," and an inability to communicate with the
seller, who, in any event would at best have done what the buyer
did-call a plumber.
83. See cases in note 74, supra.
84. The defect in Rausch was the susceptibility of the home to flooding, a defect
that is not necessarily correctable. Compare Cox v. Moore, 367 So. 2d 424 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1979) with Davis v. Davis, 353 So. 2d 1060 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1977). The buyers
sought a reduction in price of $60,000 and damages of $80,000, plus attorneys' fees.
85. Compare Kennedy v. Jacobson-Young, Inc., 244 La. 191, 151 So. 2d 368 (1963)
with Poor v. Hemenway, 221 La. 770, 60 So. 2d 310 (1952). See also Margan v. Preci-
sion Motors, Inc., 360 So. 2d 621 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978).
86. See cases in note 74, supra.
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For those occasional cases in which the buyer, for no sufficient
reason, denies the seller an opportunity to fulfill its repair obliga-
tions, either by refusing access to the thing, having the repairs done
elsewhere, or by selling the thing, perhaps Louisiana courts now
should rule that such a buyer has waived his rights entirely. 7 Such
an approach would be consistent not only with the literal sense of
Civil Code article 2544, but also with the principal obligation of the
seller, as altered by article 2531: the seller who is not a manufac-
turer and who is in good faith is not bound absolutely to deliver a
thing that is free of redhibitory defects; rather, he is bound to
deliver a thing that is either free of defects, or can by repair be
made free of defects.
CREDIT TRANSACTIONS
Debt Collection Practices
A violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act gives rise
to an individual action in which the court may award any actual
damages sustained by the consumer-debtor, and "such additional
damages as the court may allow, but not exceeding $1,000," plus
costs and reasonable attorney's fees.88 The consumer-debtor in
Harvey v. United Adjusters" argued unsuccessfully that the Act
should be intepreted to mean that an award of $1,000 be made for
each communication or action that violates the Act. The argument
has some appeal in those cases involving persistent violations of the
Act, but the intent of Congress was seen in Harvey as providing a
range of possible damages so that the award can be tailored to fit
the particular facts. Repeated violations could result in the full
$1,000 award, while a single violation of the act might result in a "no
additional damages" award." For example, the consumer-debtor in
Carrigan v. Central Adjustment Bureau" was awarded $100 actual
damages for the mental anguish caused by the debt collector's ac-
tions, and $250 as an additional damages award, based on violations
of the Fair Debt Collection Practice Act that were not seen by the
court as harsh or abusive.
87. Cf. LA. CiV. CODE: arts. 11, 1764(2) (consensual waiver).
88. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(1), (2)(A), (3) (1980). A debt collector is not liable if the
violation of the Act was unintentional and resulted from a bona fide error that occur-
red despite procedures taken to avoid such error. See Hersbergen, Developments in
the Law, 1979-1980-Consumer Protection, 41 LA. L. REv. 443, 465-69 (1981).
89. 509 F. Supp. 1218 (D. Ore. 1981).
90. Frequent and persistent violations by the debt collector could also enhance
the award of actual damages under 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(1) (1980), upon proper evidence
thereof.
91. 502 F. Supp. 468 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
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Credit Reporting
The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine has rendered an opinion of
interest to the credit reporting industry and its legal counselors.
The state of Maine has a fair credit reporting act, similar to the
federal statute,"2 which prohibits a consumer reporting agency from
putting certain information in reports to its subscribers. For ex-
ample, information relative to the consumer's race, religion, sexual
preference, criminal charges or arrests, is not to be reported in
Maine. 3 The Maine high court decided in Equifax Services, Inc. v.
Cohen' that those restrictions are an unconstitutional infringement
on the qualified right of free speech enjoyed by those who sell con-
sumer reports." The Equifax decision does not directly affect the
federal Fair Credit Reporting Act, but it does at least raise a doubt
as to the constitutionality of section 1691c of the Federal Act, pro-
hibiting the reporting of obsolete information."
Recent Supreme Court Decisions Concerning Credit Transactions
Creditors subject to the Federal Truth in Lending Act are re-
quired to disclose the existence of any security interest that has
been or will be taken either in the property purchased or in other of
the the debtor's property. 7 Four of the five Courts of Appeals that
had ruled on the issue held that the assignment of insurance pro-
ceeds and unearned insurance premiums created a security interest
that must be disclosed under the Truth in Lending Act.9 The Supreme
Court's majority opinion in Anderson Brothers Ford v. Valencia"
relies on the expressed intent of the Federal Reserve Board in its
revised Regulation Z10° and the legislative history of the Revised
92. 10 M.R.S.A. § 1312 (Supp. 1979-80); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681t (1980).
93. 10 M.R.S.A. § 1321 (Supp. 1979-80).
94. 420 A.2d 189 (Maine 1980).
95. The Maine Act could constitutionally have prohibited a user of consumer
reports from basing credit-granting decisions on the "suspect" information categories
in question. 420 A.2d at 206.
96. The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in the case.
97. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1637(a)(6), 1638(a)(9) (1980); 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.5(b)(3), .11(f)(12),
.11(h)(2)(xii) (Revised Reg. Z, 1980). The term is defined in Regulation Z to mean "an in-
terest in property that secures performance of a consumer credit or lease obligation
and that is recognized by and enforceable under state law." 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(bb)
(Revised. Reg. Z, 1980).
98. Murphy v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 629 F.2d 556 (8th Cir. 1980); Souife v. First
Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 628 F.2d 480 (5th Cir. 1980); Valencia v. Anderson Bros. Ford,
617 F.2d 1278 (7th Cir. 1980); Gennuso v. Commercial Bank & Trust Co., 566 F.2d 437
(3d Cir. 1977). The Tenth Circuit had ruled to the contrary. James v. Ford Motor
Credit Co., 638 F.2d 147 (10th Cir. 1980).
99. 101 S. Ct. 2266 (1981).
100. See 46 Fed. Reg. 20,853 (1981).
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Truth in Lending Act,"1 in holding that such assignments are not
"security interests" under the Act. The dissent in Valencia stresses
the support for the contrary view provided by the plain language of
the statute and by established principles of statutory construction.
The Valencia decision will not rank among the court's great utter-
ances, but it does serve the spirit of Revised Truth in Lending by'
eliminating a disclosure that arguably contributed to a problem of
information overkill under the old Act.
Under the original Regulation Z, an "arranger" of credit was as
much a "creditor" ' 2 as the actual extender of credit, and each was
responsible for the disclosures, 3 although the seller-arranger
typically would have primary responsibility therefor."' In Ford
Motor Credit Co. v. Cenancell the Court approved as a satisfactory
disclosure of Ford Motor Credit Company's creditor status the state-
ment in the automobile installment contract that notified the buyer
that the contract was assigned by the dealer to Ford Motor Credit.
The Revised Truth in Lending Act negates any importance the
Cenance decision might have had, for the revised Act defines
"creditor" as the person to whom the debt is initially payable on the
face of the evidence of indebtedness.' If that party is the dealer,
there is no need to identify Ford Motor Credit Company as a
creditor, for it is not; if Ford Motor Credit Company is the person to
whom the debt is initially payable, the dealer is not a creditor even
though it may have arranged that credit.
The message of Valencia and Cenance is a clear and familiar
one: the court is cutting back on the litigation potential under
federal consumer protection laws, as it has done in the federal
securities law area."7 This development finds support in and certainly
parallels the revision of Truth in Lending, but was likely inevitable
in any event.' Further evidence of the shrinkage in the litigation
101. See Report of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs,
S. REP. No. 96-368, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1979).
102. 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(h), (s) (1979).
103. Id .6(d).
104. Id.
105. 101 S. Ct. 2239 (1981).
106. 15 U.S.C. § 1602(f) (1980). The "arranger" concept is narrowed to include one
who arranges for an extension of consumer credit from one who is not a "creditor"
under the Act. ld.
107. See Brooks, Rule 10-b5 in the Balance: An Analysis of the Supreme Court's
Policy Perspective, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 403 (1980); Freeman, A Study in Contrasts: The
Warren and Burger Courts' Approach to the Securities Law, 83 DiCK. L. REV. 183
(1979).
108. See Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555 (1980), discussed in
Hersbergen, supra note 88, at 446-49.
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potential under federal consumer protection laws is found in
American Express Co. v. Koerner.'"' Koerner & Company had ap-
plied for and received American Express Credit cards in the com-
pany name, for use by its officers. Mr. Koerner had the use of one of
the company cards, and had agreed to be jointly and severally liable
with the Koerner Company for all charges incurred by use of the
card. But Mr. Koerner occasionally used the company card issued to
him for personal expenses, in which case he would, quite properly,
pay the indebtedness himself.
A billing dispute arose between American Express and its card-
holder, Koerner & Company, in 1975. With respect to billing
disputes between a creditor and an obligor, the Fair Credit Billing
Act"' of 1974 establishes procedures for resolution of such disputes.
That Act was designated as part "D" of Subchapter I of the Con-
sumer Credit Protection Act and therefore within section 1602's
definitions; "creditor," under section 1602's expressed reference to
part D, meant "card issuers,"'1 which arguably meant that Ameri-
can Express must follow the procedures of part D, the Fair Credit
Billing Act. American Express did not follow those procedures, but
argued successfully that it had not made an "extension of consumer
credit"' 2 and was therefore not subject to the Fair Credit Billing
Act. Neither the disputed charges nor the primary purpose for ob-
taining the card could be characterized as extensions of consumer
credit. The court Unanimously agreed with American Express.
CONSUMER LEASES
Return of Lessee Deposits
When the lessee in Altazin v. Pirello"3 vacated her apartment
on August 15, 1977, at the demand of the lessor,"' the lessor came
under the commandment of Revised Statutes 9:3251 that her $50
deposit "shall be returned . . . within one month" of termination. A
109. 101 S. Ct. 2281 (1981).
110. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1666-1666j (1974).
111. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1602(f), (k), & (n) (1974). Section 1602(f) defines "creditor" for other
purposes as an extender of credit.
112. The Fifth Circuit, in reversing the trial court, had determined that the per-
sonal liability of Mr. Koerner for charges made by use of the card made the transac-
tion one of an extension of consumer credit. Koerner v. American Express Co., 615
F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1980), rev'g 444 F. Supp. 334 (E.D. La. 1977).
113. 391 So. 2d 1267 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980).
114. The lessee's apartment had been damaged by a fire, following which she had
moved into another apartment in the same building. The lessor's manager gave the
lessee instructions to "vacate your apartment by 8/31/77, due to repairs needed to this
section." Id. at 1268.
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lessor retaining any portion of the deposit "shall forward to the
lessee ... an itemized statement accounting for the proceeds which
are retained and giving reasons therefor," also within one month of
termination. A failure of the lessor to remit either the deposit, or
the remaining portion thereof with an accompanying itemization and
statement of reasons, within one month of the termination date, may
or may not be willful; if it is, the lessee has the right to recover, in
addition to the deposit, any actual damages, or two hundred dollars,
whichever is greater, together with attorney's fees awardable in the
discretion of the court.' The lessor in Altazin had neither remitted
nor accounted for the lessee's deposit by November 23, 1977, when
the lessee made a written demand for same." ' A written demand for
return of the deposit cannot be ignored by a lessor; failure to remit
within thirty days after written demand for a refund "shall con-
stitute willful failure" under La. R.S. 9:3252. ' The lessor in Altazin
also let this period expire, negating any defensible position it might
have had regarding the deposit. That should have meant an auto-
matic imposition of the $200 award, and a discretionary award of at-
torney's fees. The trial court awarded only the $50 deposit.
The trial court premised its judgment on the fact that the
deposit check had been drawn in the lessee's maiden name, while
the rental agreement had been signed in an anticipated married
name which the lessee never assumed. The lessor subsequently re-
flected the lessee's maiden name on the rental agreement. In short,
the trial court did not believe that willfulness had been shown in the
case. Under section 3252, however, willfulness is established by the
failure to remit upon written demand. The first circuit court of ap-
peals in Altazin corrected the error by awarding the $200 and $1000
in attorney's fees, but Altazin is one of those cases that never
should have been.It should not have been necessary to file the action,
nor should it have been defended by the lessor, and an appeal from
the trial court's judgment should not have been necessary. Section
3252 of the statute is clear, and moreover, the issue of bona fide
mistake or dispute was settled in the first circuit in 1974 contrary to
115. LA. R.S. 9:3252. 3253 (Supp. 1972).
116. The lessee enlisted the aid of the Consumer Protection Center, and in
response to a letter from the Center, the lessor denied ever having received a deposit
from the lessee and falsely accused the lessee of causing of a fire in her apartment. 391
So. 2d at 1268.
117. Logically, an accounting and statement of reasons thereof, within the thirty
days of the lessee's demand should avoid the impact of section 3252; the statute,
however, mentions the "accounting and statement of reasons" option only in connec-
tion with the "one month after the date the tenancy terminates" feature of section
3251, with section 3252 referring solely to a "failure to remit" within thirty days after
written demand.
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the position taken by lessor."' Had the lessor's frivolous defense
caused the appeal in Altazin, such would have been a good candidate
for frivolous appeal damages." 9 Perhaps the appellate courts should
so classify cases such as Altazin.
The return of lessee deposit law has been amended 2 ' to require
that in the event of a transfer of the lessor's interest in the leased
premises during the term of the lease, the lessor must also transfer
the sums deposited as security to his successor in interest. When
the transfer of deposits occurs the lessor-transferor is relieved of
further liability with respect to the deposit; however, a willful viola-
tion of section 3251 gives the lessee the right to recover the two
hundred dollar damages award from the lessor or from the lessor's
successor in interest.'' As amended, the law does not require a
return of deposit to the lessee who abandons the premises, either
without giving a required notice or prior to the termination of the
lease. "'
The Lessor's Implied Warranty Obligations
The lessor in Louisiana is bound "from the very nature of the
contract, and without any clause to that effect" to deliver the leased
premises in good condition, and free from any repairs, and to main-
tain the premises free of vices and defects and "in a condition such
as to serve for the use for which it is hired."'23 The storage facilities
leased in Tassin v. Slidell Mini-Storage, Inc.2' did not meet that
Civil Code implied warranty standard, but the lessor argued that
responsibility for the condition of the premises had been shifted to
the lessee by a waiver of the implied warranty. The lessor's implied
warranties of suitability, as those of the seller, may be renounced or
modified.' The law has been clear for some time that to be effective
against the buyer, a seller-stipulated renunciation of implied warranty
must appear in the key sale document, be clear, unambiguous, ex-
plicit and unequivocal, and be brought to the attention of the buyer
118. Bradwell v. Carter, 299 So. 2d 853 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974); Hersbergen, The
Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1973.1974 Term - Consumer Law, 35
LA. L. REV. 384, 392-95 (1975); Hersbergen, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate
Courts for the 1975-1976 Term-Consumer Law, 37 LA. L. REV. 450, 458-60 (1977).
119. LA. CODE CiV. P. art. 2164.
120. 1981 La. Acts, No. 499 § 1.
121. LA. R.S. 9:3252, as amended by 1981 La. Acts, No. 499 § 1.
122. LA. R.S. 9:3251(c). as amended by 1981 La. Acts, No. 499 § 1.
123. LA. CiV. CODE arts. 2692, 2693 & 2695. See Louisiana Nat'l Leasing Corp. v.
ADF Serv., Inc., 377 So. 2d 92 (La. 1979).
124. 396 So. 2d 1261 (1981).
125. Louisiana Nat'l Leasing Corp. v. ADF Serv., Inc., 377 So. 2d 92 (La. 1979); LA.
CiV. CODE arts. 11, 1764(2), & 1901.
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or explained to him. Furthermore, because the renunciation of im-
plied warranty is in derogation of general law it is to be construed
strictly.' 6 A renunciation of implied warranty is not enforceable by
the manufacturer or the seller not in good faith.'27
The Louisiana Supreme Court indicates in Tassin that the issues
relative to renunciation of the lessor's implied warranties will be
resolved by analogy to the already established law of sales. In
Tassin, for example, the lessor knew or should have known that the
storage units in question were defective'26 since they would not protect
lessee's property against the entry of normally occurring rain water.
Knowledge or reason to know of the defective condition of the thing
leased made the lessee's renunciation of implied warranty not
obligatory, and the lessor was liable for the water damage to
lessee's property.
The Lessor's Obligations With Respect to Lessee Safety
One of the most significant recent developments in the common
law is the emergence of an implied warranty of habitability in leases
of residential space, a warranty that the premises are safe, sanitary,
and free of latent defects so as to be suitable for the intended use.'"
Important to the development of common law as the implied warran-
ty of habitability may be, the identical principle resides in articles
2692, 2693, 2695 and 2699 of the Louisiana Civil Code. The implied
warranty of habitability has been expanded in some states to the
point that one must now question seriously the viability of the tradi-
tional common law rule that the lessor owes no special duty to pro-
tect the lessee from criminal acts committed on the premises by
third parties. '
Lessees injured on the premises by the criminal acts of third
parties were occasionally successful during the late 1960's and early
126. See Hersbergen. supra note 27, at 619-21.
127. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2548.
128. The storage unit door did not close flush with the concrete flooring of the unit
(which sloped toward the rear of the unit), and no shelving has been provided. 396 So.
2d at 1262.
129. See Line, Implied Warranties of Habitability and Fitness for Intended Use in
Urban Residential Leases, 26 BAYLOR L. REV. 161 (1974). The implied warranty is
recognized in a majority of the states, either by judicial decision or by statute. The
decisions and statutes are listed at Recent Developments, Expanding the Scope of the
Implied Warranty of Habitability: A Landlord's Duty to Protect Tenants From
Foreseeable Criminal Activity, 33 VAN. L. REV. 1493, 1493 n.1 (1980).
130. See Teal] v. Harlow, 275 Mass. 448, 176 N.E. 533 (1931); Recent Developments,
supra note 129,-at 1494. The lessor would owe his lessee a duty of care under "familiar
negligence concepts." Trentacost v. Brussel, 82 N.J. 214, 220, 412 A.2d 436, 439 (1980.
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1970's in establishing the concept of lessor liability in tort, where
the lessor knew or should have known of the likelihood of criminal
acts on the premises. 3' The principles of superseding cause' and
forseeability,'n however, detract considerably from the effectiveness
of a tort remedy. If the criminal act can be brought within the scope
of the warranty of habitability, however, the protection for the
lessee becomes less restrictive. Thus, if secure windows and doors
are deemed a feature of the implied warranty,' entry grained by
the robber or rapist as a result of the breach of that contractual duty
would perhaps present for the lessee-plaintiff more certainty of out-
come. The Supreme Court of New Jersey has taken that step in its
1980 decision in Trentacost v. Brussel, holding that the implied war-
ranty of habitability obliges the lessor to furnish reasonable
safeguards to protect tenants from foreseeable criminal activity on
the premises, independently of any knowledge or notice of particular
risks or unsafe conditions.'
The impact of Trentacost will be some time in the measuring.'36
The Trentacost issue, however, is certain to arise in Louisiana; when
it does arise, the plaintiff will be faced with the 1977 decision of the
third circuit court of appeal in Robicheaux v. Roy, 3 ' which found.no
lessor liability, premised either on the duties set out in Civil Code
articles 2692, 2693, and 2695, or on those set out in Civil Code art-
icles 2315, 2316, and 2317, with respect to the loss suffered by a
lessee merchant as a result of a burglary.'38 Although the duties of
the lessor of habitable space could certainly be viewed by Louisiana
courts in a different light, the Robicheaux decision not only found
131. See, e.g., Scott v. Watson, 278 Md. 160, 359 A.2d 548 (1976); Johnston v. Harris,
387 Mich. 569, 198 N.W.2d 409 (1972); Braitman v. Overlook Terrace, 68 N.J. 368, 346
A.2d 76 (1975); Sherman v. Concourse Realty Corp., 47 A.D.2d 134, 365 N.Y.S.2d 239
(1975).
132. See Trice v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 14 Ill. App. 3d 97, 302 N.E.2d 207 (1973);
Hall v. Franknoi, 69 Misc. 2d 470, 330 N.Y.S.2d 637 (Civ. Ct. 1972).
133. See Goldberg v. Housing Auth. of Newark, 38 N.J. 578, 186 A.2d 291 (1962);
Gulf Reston, Inc. v. Rogers, 215 Va. 155, 207 S.E.2d 841 (1974).
134. See Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970).
135. 82 N.J. 214, 412 A.2d 436 (1980). The warranty was held to have been breached
by the lessor's failure to secure the building's front door.
136. See Recent Developments, supra note 129; Note, Landlord Liability for
Criminal Acts On Residential Premises: What Future for Tennessee?, 10 MEM. ST. L.
REV. 724 (1980); Note, Security: A New Standard for Habitability, 42 U. PITT. L. REV.
415 (1981).
137. 352 So. 2d 766 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 354 So. 2d 207 (La. 1978).
138. The unknown burglar had entered the leased premises through a hole cut in
the common wall between the subject premises and other premises rented by the
lessor to an unknown lessee. 352 So. 2d at 767.
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the absence of a lessor duty to investigate the backgrounds of pro-
spective lessees, but also it relied heavily on Civil Code article 2703
in affirming the action of the trial court in sustaining the lessor's ex-
ception of no cause of action. Article 2703 states, in relevant part,
that the lessor is not bound to guarantee the lessee against distur-
bances caused by persons not claiming any right to the premises.
While article 2703 may properly be seen as a reference to the
lessor's "peaceable possession" obligation under article 2692,' the
Louisiana Supreme Court might adopte the Philippe v. Browning
Arms Co. rationale in deciding the issue: Civil Code articles 2315
and 2316 are the fountainhead of tort responsibility in a personal in-
jury case, but the court must decide the applicable standard of con-
duct by consulting the many other Code articles, statutes and laws
which provide for certain responsibilities according to the person,
activities, or relationship involved;" ' in a case such as Trentacost,
Civil Code article 2703 certainly affects that standard.
139. See Comment, Disturbance of the Lessee's Possession in Louisiana, 29 LA. L.
REV. 101, 113-14 (1968).
140. 395 So. 2d 310, 318 (La. 1981).
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USED CAR BUYERS GUIDE
IMPORTANT: Spoken promises are difficult to enforce. Ask the dealer to
put all promises In writing. Keep this form.
VEHICLE MAKE MODEL ID NUMBER
NOTICE: For your protection and safety
Ask about the current condition of the following major mechanical and safety systems of
this car. See below which of these systems, if any, are covered by a warranty end which
systems are known by the dealer to contain major defects. Dealers must inform you in
writing if they know of certain defects in this car's major systems.
Frame & Body
Engine












PRE PURCHASE INSPECTION. Ask the dealer if you may have this car inspected by your mechanic
either on or off the lot.
WARRANTIES FOR THIS CAR:
NO IMPLIED WARRANTY-"AS IS". This means you will pay all costs for any repairs needed when
you buy the car or after the time of sale. If this box is checked, the dealer makes no written promises
about this car's condition.
FULL LIMITED WARRANTY. The dealer will pay % of the total repair bill for covered systems that
fail during the warranty Ask the dealer for a copy of the warranty document for a full explanation of war-
ranty coverage, exclusions, and the dealer's repair obligations. Under state law, "implied warranties"
may give you even more rights.
SYSTEMS COVERED: DURATION:
SERVICE CONTRACT. A service contract is available from
for $ -extra. This service contract adds to the dealer's responsibilities under any warranty. If you buy
a service contract within 90 days of the time of sale, state law "implied warranties" may give you addi-
tional rights.
MAJOR KNOWN DEFECTS: Dealers must tell you in the space below if they know about certain defects
in this car's major systems. The defects that must be disclosed if known are listed on the back of this
form. However, there may be defects that are unknown to the dealer. If nothing is listed, the car is not
necessarily free of defects.
See the back of this form for important additional major defect information.
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Below is a list of some major defects that may occur in used cars.
Frame & Body
Frame-cracks, corrective welds, or rusted
through
Dogtracks-bent or twisted frame
Engine
Oil leakage excluding normal seepage
Cracked block or head
Beltsmissing or inoperable
Knocks or misses related to camshaft
litters and push rods
Abnormal exhaust discharge
Transmission & Drive Shaft
Improper fluid level or leakage, excluding
normal seepage
Cracked or damaged case which is visible
Abnormal noise or vibration caused by
faulty transmission or drive shaft
Improper shifting or functioning in any gear
Manual clutch slips or chatters
Differential
Improper fluid level or leakage excluding
normal seepage
Cracked or damaged housing which is visible



















Failure warning light broken
Pedal not firm under pressure (DOT specs.)
Not enough pedal reserve (DOT specs.)
Does not stop vehicle in straight line
(DOT specs.)
Hoses damaged
Drum or rotor too thin (Mfgr specs)
Lining or pad thickness less than 1/32 inch
Power unit not operating or leaking
Structural or mechanical parts damaged
Steering System
Too much free play at steering wheel
(DOT specs.)
Free play in linkage more than 1/4 inch
Steering gear binds or jams
Front wheels aligned improperly
(DOT specs.)
Power unit belts cracked or slipping
Power unit fluid level improper
Suspension System
Ball joint seals damaged
Structural parts bent or damaged
Stabilizer bar disconnected
Spring broken
Shock absorber mounting loose
Rubber bushings damaged or missing
Radius rod damaged or missing
Shock absorber leaking or functioning
improperly
Tires




Visible cracks damage or repairs




IMPORTANT: The imformation on this form is part of any contract to buy this vehicle Removal of this
label before consumer purchase lexcept for purpose of test-driving).is a violation of federal law 116 C F R
4551
Defect disclosure specifications are printed in Volume 16 C F R ICode of Federal Regulations) Part 455
